Address of Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC) to Association of United States Army in Columbia, S.C., 1959 November 18 by Thurmond, Strom
,. ,.... ~ - ADDRESS OF SENATOR STROM THURl\-10ND ( D-SC) TO ASSOCIATION OF UNITED 
STATES ARMY IN COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA. ON NOVEMBER 18, 1959. 
Problems and troubles of the moment, whether national or 
personal, always seem to us of greater complexity and severity/ 
than either those of the past or the future. And beyond any doubt, 
the worse problems we have/ are those that hang around unsolved and 
I 
unresolved/ for extended periods. If they remain long enough, 
however, we become accustomed to them, and it is human nature for 
each of us to reach a point here we delude ourselves into believing 
that if we just drift along, the problem will resolve itself. This, 
unfortunately, is the stage at which a problem or trouble becomes 
most dangerous. 
Our problem of national defense has been plaguing us for a 
considerable time--in fact, since the beginning of our Nation. 
Almost from the start we have been trying to ignore itjin the hope 
that it will go away or resolve itself. The late General George 
C. Marshall once said, ''We ha\re tried since the birth of our 
I I 
Nation/ to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness." 
The truth of these wo~ds were acknowledged by all Americans during 
World War II, and we assured ourselves that we would never allow 
the United States/to be caught unprepared again. 
A brief review of our defense efforts in the post war decade / 
indicates that we have not been completely successful/ in breaking 
with tradition in this respect. 
In 1945 and '46, we followed our unbroken historical post­
/ 
war practice; of rapid demobilization of our Armed Forces. Thus we 
1"'egan our out-in-the-open struggle with the forces of Communism ' 
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from a position of weakness. By 1947, we were beginning to realize 
the error of our ways, and a rather slow, almost half-hearted, 
build-up of conventional forces was commenced. The creation of 
the Department of Defense and the reorganization of the Armed Forces / 
were the most notable advancesof this rebuilding effort. 
In 194$, communist capabilities had been underrated to the 
extent / that we re7ersed our course / and again began over-economizing 
our defense. These defense cut-backs continued until we were 
I 
rudely shocked into an almost awakened state by the outbreak of 
the Korean conflict in 1950. It was here that we became initiated 
into the concept of "limited war." Even during this period of 
armed conflict, we limited our efforts largely to those required 
by that conflict itself. 
Only after the end of the Korean war/ did we seriously concern 
ourselves with what we th,~n thour;ht of /as weapons of the future--
missiles. 
We approai::hed t.he d<:'lvelc,'.)ffient of missiles with a measured 
pace, comfortable in the imagi ~ed sefety of our superiority in 
nuclear devices /and the potentcy of our Strategic Air Command Forces. 
It was not until the fall of 1957/ that we came face to face with 
1the hard facts of life--that R_:ssian Communists were a foe worthy 
of our best efforts. It took Sputnik to bring us to a realization 
of our peril, if indeed we have yet truly faced that reality. 
Our errors in the d9cade following World War rr/4re easy to 
detect from the vantage point cf hindsight. In view of the history 
of the American people, our commission of errors should not be 
r.urprising to us. We are truly a peace-loving peoples, most 
reluctant to concern oursGl\·es with war until we are backed to the 
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wall. Our strength, and even our survival, has · traditionally 
resided in our ability to unify and concentrate our effort in 
extreme emergency. 
I 
While there is nothing to be gained / from hurling blame for 
the errors of defense policy in the post-war period, our mistakes 
should remain fresh in our minds. Unless we profit from the 
experience of our mintakes, we may well have no further chance to 
overcome those mistakes. 
During the past two years, two conclusions have been, or 
should have been, crystal clear. First, we stand second best in 
development of new weaponry; and second, our survival, at some 
future date, depends on our moving from second best to first, and 
staying ahead when we get there. 
Our present defense polic~r/ is framed around the maintenance 
0f a deterrent force with sufficient capability/ to make it obviously 
unwise for any aggressor nation/ to chance its unleashing. Today, 
and possibly for some time yet to come, insofar as an all-out 
nuclear war is concerned, we have such a deterrent force. It is 
comprised principally of the Stratcgj_ ,:: Air Force/ and its long-range 
nuclear capabilities. Supplementing the Strategic Air Force are 
intermediate range ballistic missile ringing our potential enemy 
at widely dispersed sites, and carrier-based aircraft with nuclear 
capabilities. There can be little question/ that the Atlas inter­
continental ballistic missile will soon be available in sufficient 
operational numbers /to complement and eventually replace, with 
its successor ICBM9s, the Strategic Air Command. 
As long as our potential enemies must rely principally on 
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ICBM's for offensive efforts, our retaliatory capabilities should 
be sufficient as a deterrent force/ to prevent all-out war. 
Grave danger now lies in our self-satisfaction at the fact / 
that our present retaliatory forces are a sufficient deterrent, 
despite our failure to decrease the Soviet's scientific lead / 
demonstrated by Sputnik, and reproven by the recent Russian Lunar 
probe. I fear we are once again in danger of planning our 
retaliatory defense forces / around weapons of today. The inter­
continental ballistic missile, with its nuclear war-head, is no 
more an ultimate weapon/ than was the Maginot Line or the Atom bomb 
dropped on Hiroshima. There has never been an ultimate weapon, 
nor is there .any sound reason to believe there ever will be one. 
Let us be more .specific. If one nation now develops a 
space platforrn /relatively impregnable to attack/ by its enemies' 
~jresent state of weapon development, the stalemate is broken. An 
c;·ttack could not be stopp~d by any amount of retaliation /cm the 
aggressor's homeland. This is where the lead in scientific develop­
ment, now obviously anjoyed by the Soviet Union in the field of 
thrust and rocketry, must be overcome. It is no answer to rely on 
our presently suffic:tent retaliatory force. A bare minimum may 
suffice for the present, but at some future state, it will prove 
woefully inadequate. 
Let me interject at this point--the national defense is not, 
and must not be, a partisan matter. With this thought in mind, 
however, it must be said by way of constructive criticism, that 
the present administration's defense policy is and has been / 
dangerously close to maintenance of the bare minimum. Two years 
:1ave now passed since the launching of the first Russian satellite, 
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which led to the widely accepted belief/that we trailed the Russians 
by about five years in rocket propulsion development. In these 
two years/ there have been no indications that we have substantially 
reduced the margin/between their level of progress in this field 
and our own. 
, Admittedly, research and development are time-consuming, and 
concrete results are seldom immediately apparent. We have seen 
repeated proof in the past, however, that we have the potentialities 
for immense surges, such as that shown in the development of the 
Atom bomb during World War II. Now is the time for the exercise 
of our maximum potentialities, for our peril is even greater than 
that which inspired our A-bomb development. 
If we are to prevent the outbreak of an all-out nuclear war, 
WG ~ regain and maintain first place / in all fields of weapon 
~evelopment. This should be and remain our first and foremost 
obj ective. 
There are those who are cf the honest opinion / that if we 
4chieve a lead in missiles and their successor weapons of the future, 
011:.."' defense problems are ~clved. Not only do they picture 11massive 
retaliation" /as a detsr~e~t to all-out war, but also as a deterrent 
to limited wars, such as that in Korea and Indo-China. I do not 
believe that such an opinion is sound. 
One of the basic ingredients in any effective deterrent/4s 
the enemy 9 s conviction/ that our power will be unleashed should he 
t2ke the action we would deter. 
Now the Communists are quite aware that should they commence 
:' n.uclear exchange, every destructive weapon at our command would 
u,! unleashed against them. Quite frankly, we would have no 
- 5 -
. .., 
alternative, and the Communist leaders know this as well as we do • 
But what about a localized aggression against a small country 
with satellite troops? Is the Communist leader convinced/ that we 
would commence a nuclear exchange to prevent it? I seriously doubt 
we as a people/ have convinced ourselves that we would go so far. 
We had nuclear weapons at the time of the Korean war, and at the 
time of the Indo-Chinese war, but we refrained from using them. 
We decided it the wiser course to limit the conflict. Why should 
the enemy conclude that we would react differently in the future? 
For that matter, why should we assume that we would react differently 
now? We as a people have no less distaste for a nuclear exchange 
than we had earlier. 
Our "massive retaliation" power is an effective deterrent to 
all-out war, but not to limited wars. We must have an additional 
deterrent if we would prevent them. 
The additional deterrent lies in conventional forces. These 
forces must be in sufficient n:.11-:ibers and adequately equipped, 
supported by the capability of rapid tran3port to any part of the 
world. Our present conventio~al for~es are not sufficient in 
numbers, equipment ncr transport to constitute a sufficient deterrent 
to limited wars. Th~s weakness must be recognized and corrected. 
Defense is an expensive matter-. A complete and well-rounded 
deterrent force will cost even more/ than we are now spending on 
military forces,--and in fiscal 1959 we reached an all-time high for 
peacetime defense expenditures. We may as well face the fact now, 
however, that we have no alternative to spending whatever is 
necessary/ to be first in armed might, regardless of the cost. 
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Just as important, we must build our armed strength within the 
framework of a balanced budget. 
Let me say here and now/4hat economy and adequate national 
defense are not alternatives. If they are, we are doomed. It is 
only by the practice of the strictest economy that we can maintain 
the strength of our economic system essential to support a strong 
defensive force. We must refrain from entering new fields of 
Federal spending except under the most compelling circumstances; 
and we must continuously examine all Federal programs with a view, 
' 
toward reducing their costs--and indeed, eliminating some of them 
altogether. We must insure that full value is received for every 
taxpayer's dollar spent, and this applies particularly to the defense 
expenditures, since they comprise the major part of the Federal 
bu.Jget. 
Money alone, however, is not the answer to our defense/ any 
more than it is the sole answer to any of our other problems. If 
we have one weak national characteristic, it is overconfidence in 
t h~ power of the almighty dollar. Without wise and far-sighted 
planning, without efficient organization, and without a strong moral 
det ermination by our people to succeed, we ce.:n treble our expe!'ldi­
tures to no avail. Sufficient funds are an absolute necessity, but 
funds do not co~stitute our principal deficiency. 
If we are to rea2pture preeminence in the field of weaponry 
development, we must first provide efficiency and singleness of 
purpose into the orga.niza.tion/ which administers the program. 
In 1947, we took a step toward unification of our defense 
I 
forces by creation of the Department cf Defen3e. Several relatively 
minor reorganizations have been attempted since that time--the last 
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being in 1958. The time has now come, if it has not already passed, 
when unification of the Armed Forces must be obtained in fact. We 
can no longer afford the agonizing arguments~ hat spring from the 
understandable loyalties to the various services. No longer can we 
tolerate the existence of red-tape studded with limited authority / 
to make negative decisions or recommend action to another level. 
There is no time left for delayed decisions /which p9stpone the 
beginning of progress in specific fields of research and development. 
The very fact that our n~tional policy toward communism/ is 
built around a deterrent fore presupposes that our defense problem 
is here to stay. It will not go away or disappear. Our "detet'rent" 
policy is also premised on the supposition/4hat we will no longer 
try to promote peace by a display of weakness. If we are to succeed 
with this policy, and there is no other choice, we must get down to 
business by the following steps: 
1. Achieve the necessary degree of unificatidn of our Armed 
Forces that will insure elimination ' of service bickering and delays 
in decision making. 
' 2. Provide the neces3ary funds and emphasis to our weapons 
research and development program to insure a realization of our 
maximum potential. · · 
3. Increase · the number of our -conventional forces and begin 
immediately on a stepped-up program of modernization of equipment 
and provision of transport for those forces. 
4. Economize on all non-defense expenditures in order to 
provide for the national defense adequately within a balanced budget. 
These are not easy goals to achieve. They will be most 
difficult to accomplish. In them, however, lies the only road to 
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preservation of our freedom, perhaps our existence, and victory 
over Communism. 
Whether or not we are successful in achieving these essential 
goals / depends on the American people. The people are the finaL 
authority / in the formation of the policies of the Government. No 
fact has better illustrated this truth / than the successful demand 
by the public / for a labor reform bill earlier this year. 
If the American public will demand of Congress and the Executive 
Branch/ that the United States be made first in defense, these goals 
can and will be attained. Let us hope that the traditional love 
of peace by Americans/will be matched with equal determination to 
secure the peace/ through a defense establishment second to none. 
- END -
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